

Message Text

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5389

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 01518

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, US

SUBJECT: CCD: US STATEMENT AT OPENING OF 1978 SPRING
SESSION OF THE CCD - JANUARY 31, 1978

1. TEXT OF AMBASSADOR A.S. FISHER'S STATEMENT AT THE
OPENING OF THE 1978 SPRING SESSION OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FOLLOWS
BELOW. WEEKLY REPORT OF CCD TO FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

MADAME CHAIRMAN,

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AS WE LOOK TO THE YEAR AHEAD, WE SEE A VERY ACTIVE PERIOD
IN THE AREA OF DISARMAMENT. WE ARE GETTING CLOSER TO THE
REALIZATION OF MANY OF OUR LONG-SOUGHT-AFTER GOALS --
A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROHIBITION,
A NEW SALT AGREEMENT -- AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE ARE
CONSIDERING NEW STEPS, LIKE CONVENTIONAL ARMS LIMITATIONS,
WHICH WILL LEAD US FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD TO GENUINE

DISARMAMENT. I BELIEVE WE ALL SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING LASTING PEACE AND MAKING A DISARMED WORLD A REALITY.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

I AM HAPPY TO REPORT THAT, SINCE WE LAST MET, THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE MADE PROGRESS WITH RESPECT TO A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN. TRILATERAL TALKS ON THIS IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL MEASURE ARE CONTINUING AT THIS TIME.

A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN HAS PROVEN TO BE AN ELUSIVE GOAL FOR MANY YEARS. HOWEVER, THIS YEAR IT APPEARS WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE MAY AT LAST BE IN SIGHT OF THE GOAL WHICH PRIME MINISTER NEHRU ADDRESSED 24 YEARS AGO WHEN HE MADE THE FIRST CALL FOR A CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AND WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER REITERATED IN HIS RECENT SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHEN HE SAID "... THE TIME HAS COME TO END ALL EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR DEVICES, NO MATTER WHAT THEIR CLAIMED JUSTIFICATION -- PEACEFUL OR MILITARY."

IN THIS GROUP, I KNOW I NEED NOT DWELL AT ANY LENGTH ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A CTB. WE ALL BELIEVE THAT IT WILL HELP TO BRING A HALT TO THE QUALITATIVE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. IT WILL BE APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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STATES ALIKE. FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, IT WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO REDUCED DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, IT WILL SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE INCENTIVES TO DEVELOP A TECHNOLOGY LEADING TO A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. FOR BOTH, IT WILL SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT MEASURE TO SUPPORT OUR COLLECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.

THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN OUR TALKS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN THESE MANY MONTHS ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY THWARTED EARLIER EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A BAN. BUT WE HOPE TO PRESENT TO THE CCD AT AN EARLY DATE THE RESULTS OF THE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING ON SO THAT WE HERE CAN COMPLETE THE WORK ON A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN WHICH WILL HAVE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE ADHERENCE.

WE AT THE CCD WILL SOON BE DEALING WITH ONE ASPECT OF THIS PROBLEM WHEN WE RECEIVE THE REPORT OF THE SEISMIC EXPERTS ON MARCH 7. THIS IS, OF COURSE, THE PROBLEM OF A SEISMIC DATA INFORMATION EXCHANGE. THE EXTENSIVE STUDY WHICH HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS AREA, IN OUR VIEW, CAN MAKE

A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHER WORK ON A CTB,
WHICH WE HOPE SOON TO BE CONSIDERING.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

ANOTHER IMPORTANT DISARMAMENT MEASURE ON WHICH WE HOPE TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CCD THIS YEAR CONCERNS CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. OF COURSE, WE ALREADY HAVE THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF
1925 DEALING WITH POISON GAS. BUT, SUBSTANTIAL THOUGH
THIS AGREEMENT IS, ITS PROHIBITION IS LIMITED TO USE. IT
DOES NOT DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIAL STOCKPILES OF POISONOUS
GASES WHICH ARE NOW IN EXISTENCE AND WHICH COULD EASILY BE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 GENEVA 01518

POISED FOR EMPLOYMENT, OR EVEN EMPLOYED IN THE EVENT OF
A FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT.

SINCE THE END OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE CCD IN AUGUST,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE HELD THREE MORE
ROUNDS OF THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE WORK ON
A JOINT INITIATIVE BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR PRESENTA-
TION TO THE CCD. WHAT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON IS A JOINT

INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING
A CONVENTION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL
STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION
OF ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, OR STOCKPILING OF
THESE DANGEROUS WEAPONS. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS
ON THE JOINT INITIATIVE, SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS REMAIN
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TO BE RESOLVED, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF VERIFICATION.
I CANNOT PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY WHEN THE JOINT INITIATIVE
WILL BE COMPLETED. HOWEVER, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE
UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH
AGREEMENT PROMPTLY ON A JOINT INITIATIVE THAT WILL LEAD
TO CCD ELABORATION OF A CONVENTION WHICH EFFECTIVELY
ELIMINATES CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS OF STATES
PARTIES.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT THAT OUR EFFORTS TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS BE
BROUGHT PROMPTLY BEFORE THE CCD, THE MULTILATERAL FORUM
FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

AS WE HAVE STATED PREVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION WILL DIRECTLY ENGAGE ANY COUNTRY WITH
A MODERN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND POSE NEW CHALLENGES IN THE
AREA OF VERIFICATION. THESE CHALLENGES CREATE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT INNOVATIVE FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION WHICH, IN TURN, CAN BUILD THE EXPERIENCE AND
THE CONFIDENCE FOR BROADER DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN THE
YEARS AHEAD.

WE ALSO BELIEVE, IN DEALING WITH THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL
WARFARE, THAT WE ARE OPERATING AT THE FOREFRONT OF A
TECHNOLOGY WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR CREATING WEAPONS
EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN EXISTING ONES. THIS POTENTIAL IS
NOT CONFINED TO A FEW TECHNOLOGICALLY MORE ADVANCED STATES
BUT IS A FORCE WITH WHICH ALL SOCIETIES WITH A CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY HAVE TO COPE. IF WE CAN SAFEGUARD THIS TECHNOLOGY
THROUGH EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL, WE WILL BE CONTRIBUTING TO
THE KIND OF WORLD ORDER WHICH ALL OF US SURELY SEEK, NOT
ONLY FOR OURSELVES, BUT FOR COMING GENERATIONS.
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RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

ANOTHER MEASURE WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED BY THE CCD THIS YEAR IS THE PROHIBITION OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WEAPONS WHICH COULD USE RADIATION FROM NATURAL RADIOACTIVE DECAY TO CAUSE DAMAGE, DEATH OR INJURY.

LET ME EXPLAIN BRIEFLY WHY A CONVENTION ON RW WOULD BE A VALUABLE STEP. THIS CONVENTION WOULD PROHIBIT THE USE IN WARFARE OF THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WHICH IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY PLENTIFUL AS THE USE OF RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS GROWS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH OF RELATIVELY LESS SIGNIFICANCE WHEN COMPARED WITH A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN OR A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, A PROHIBITION ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR USE WOULD FILL A LOGICAL GAP IN THE PANOPLY OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AND WOULD SERVE TO HEAD OFF THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF HITHERTO UNTRIED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE 1948 UN DEFINITION. THE RELATIVELY WIDE AVAILABILITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL CREATES A POTENTIAL THREAT WHICH WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE -- ONE WHICH WE CAN EFFECTIVELY GUARD AGAINST THROUGH ARMS CONTROL, I.E., PROVIDING WE ACT PROMPTLY AND DEAL WITH SUCH WEAPONS BEFORE RATHER THAN AFTER THEY ARE IN THE ARSENALS OF STATES. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSIDER A COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE CCD'S HIGHER PRIORITY ISSUES.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

THE ACTIVITIES WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO BE GOING ON AT THE CCD MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTIVITIES THAT ARE BEING CARRIED ON ELSEWHERE WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE RESULTS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5391
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 GENEVA 01518

WE LOOK TO ACHIEVE HERE, WILL MAKE A COHERENT WHOLE. I AM REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO THE US-SOVIET TALKS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. RECENTLY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH BANS NATION-WIDE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION JOINTLY REAFFIRMED THEIR VIGOROUS SUPPORT OF THE TREATY. BOTH SIDES HAVE INDICATED THAT, PENDING FURTHER AGREEMENT ON A SALT II ACCORD, THEIR CONDUCT WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS AGREEMENT, SIGNED IN 1972, SERVED THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF LIMITING THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION WHILE BOTH SIDES SOUGHT A MORE MEANINGFUL AND DURABLE AGREEMENT LIMITING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES.
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WE NOW SEE A SALT II AGREEMENT TAKING SHAPE. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED AT AN EARLY DATE, AS WE HOPE IT WILL BE, IT WOULD LOWER THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS ON BOTH SIDES, IMPOSE CERTAIN QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, AND SET THE STAGE FOR EVEN MORE SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS IN SALT III. THE SALT II AGREEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD SECURITY, AND IT WOULD PROVIDE FURTHER STIMULUS FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL.

LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT WE ARE SEEKING ARE NOT AGREEMENTS WHICH MERELY CHANNEL COMPETITION IN CONVENIENT DIRECTIONS. THIS HAS SOMETIMES BEEN ALLEGED, BUT NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. WE SEEK SIGNIFICANT DISARMAMENT. AS PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SAID WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, "ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, WE ARE WILLING NOW TO REDUCE THEM BY 10 PERCENT, BY 20 PERCENT, EVEN BY 50 PERCENT."

FOR THIS REASON, AS SOON AS SALT II IS IN HAND, WE SHALL

PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH WORK ON SALT III WHICH WE HOPE
WILL LEAD TO FURTHER SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE
STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS

MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE CCD SHOULD PLAY A MORE
VIGOROUS ROLE IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH ARMS CONTROL
APPROACHES RELATED TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. OUR MAIN
EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD NUCLEAR ISSUES -- NON-
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PROLIFERATION AND A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. WHILE WE
AGREE THAT THESE ARE THE MOST URGENT ISSUES, WE ALSO
BELIEVE THAT EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
CANNOT WAIT UNTIL ALL IMPORTANT NUCLEAR ISSUES HAVE BEEN
RESOLVED.

ALL NATIONS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING
AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO MEET THEIR
BASIC SECURITY NEEDS. ALL NATIONS ALSO HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST IN FINDING WAYS TO REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN ORDER TO FREE LIMITED RESOURCES
FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS. IN OUR VIEW, ADEQUATE
ATTENTION HAS NOT BEEN PAID TO THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ARMS
CONTROL APPROACHES TO REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVEN-
TIONAL ARMS BOTH IN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TERMS.

ONE ASPECT OF THIS WIDER PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL IS THAT OF ARMS TRANSFERS. SINCE THE UNITED
STATES IS A MAJOR SUPPLIER, WE HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN
THIS PROBLEM AND AN OBLIGATION TO EXHIBIT RESPONSIBILITY.
THE UNITED STATES HAS ENUNCIATED A POLICY WHICH WILL GUIDE
OUR OWN ACTIONS. IT IS A POLICY OF RESTRAINING THE FLOW
OF UNNECESSARY, EXPENSIVE AND DESTABILIZING WEAPONS WHILE
RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS OF OTHERS.

THESE ARE THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES. OTHER NATIONS,
BOTH SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS, MAY HAVE OTHER VIEWS. THIS
IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THE ANSWERS ARE LIKELY TO BE COM-
PLEX AS WELL. HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE MUST
BE SOME BROAD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORT IF THIS
PROBLEM IS TO BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. WE BELIEVE THAT,
IN SEEKING A SOLUTION, OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS MUST BE
GUIDED BY TWO BROAD PRINCIPLES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5392
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
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FIRST, ALL STATES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS,
AND THESE MUST BE MET.

AND SECONDLY, BOTH PRODUCER AND CONSUMER NATIONS ARE
CONCERNED, AND A SOLUTION MUST REFLECT THE INTERESTS AND
IDEAS OF BOTH.

FOR ITS PART THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WOULD WELCOME
THE VIEWS OF OTHERS ON HOW THE CCD MIGHT FOCUS GREATER
ATTENTION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS QUESTIONS, IN GENERAL, AND
ARMS TRANSFER ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR. AS WE BEGIN OUR WORK
ON A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM, THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS ISSUES SHOULD
BE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION.
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COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM

WE ARE ALL AWARE, OF COURSE, THAT WE ARE WORKING WITH

THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT JUST OVER THE HORIZON. IT WILL BE HELD FROM MAY 23 TO JUNE 28, 1978. THE PENULTIMATE SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIS SPECIAL SESSION IS NOW UNDERWAY, INDEED MANY OF OUR COLLEAGUES ARE ATTENDING IT. THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN APRIL, AND MANY OF US MAY BE THERE ALSO.

THE IMMINENCE OF THE SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT PRESENTS US WITH A CHALLENGE BUT IT PRESENTS US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY AS WELL -- AN OPPORTUNITY TO BROADEN OUR VISION, FREE OURSELVES FROM PREOCCUPATION WITH THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES AND TRY TO BUILD FOR THE FUTURE BY STIMULATING, BROADENING, AND ACCELERATING OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT. THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE U.S. DELEGATION SUPPORTED THE DECISION OF THIS BODY OF AUGUST 29, 1977, BY WHICH WE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS SESSION AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS AND ELABORATE A DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CCD FOR CONSIDERATION.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS AS TO WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM. SINCE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ARE, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, CONSENSUAL TRANSACTIONS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SET A BINDING DEADLINE FOR AGREEMENT. IT IS ALSO A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A LOGICAL SEQUENTIAL ORDER IN MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, BOTH IN THE NUCLEAR AND IN THE CONVENTIONAL

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FIELD. OUR WORK WOULD BE EXPEDITED IF WE COME UP WITH A PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATION WHICH RECOGNIZES THIS SEQUENTIAL ORDER AND FACILITATES, RATHER THAN HINDERS, THE PROGRESS MADE HERE.

WE ALREADY HAVE SOME INTERESTING PROPOSALS BEFORE THE CCD FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE WORKING GROUP. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE WORKING GROUP WOULD BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT CONSIDERATION NOT ONLY OF PROPOSALS WHICH ARE NOW BEFORE THE CCD, BUT ALSO THOSE WHICH MAY BE SUBMITTED IN THE FUTURE.

IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT PLANS TO CONSIDER "MACHINERY FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS."

THIS MEANS THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COULD AFFECT OUR WORK HERE IN THE CCD. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WHAT WE ACCOMPLISH THIS SESSION AT THE CCD, AND HOW WE ACCOMPLISH IT, WILL HAVE A SUBSTAN-

TIAL EFFECT UPON WHAT THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE.

THE UNITED STATES IS NOT YET PREPARED TO EXPRESS ITS FINAL VIEWS AS THEY RELATE TO THE "MACHINERY FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS;" HOWEVER, I DO BELIEVE THAT A FEW PRELIMINARY REMARKS MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE.

THE CCD MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS WHAT IT IS AND HAS TO BE, IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE -- A NEGOTIATING BODY. THIS MEANS THAT IT HAS TO OPERATE BY CONSENSUS, BECAUSE EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT MEASURES CANNOT BE MANDATED BY MAJORITY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN IMPORTANT SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE. THIS ALSO MEANS THAT IT HAS TO BE A BODY OF LIMITED, BUT REPRESENTATIVE, MEMBERSHIP. A BODY MUCH LARGER THAN THE CCD WOULD LOSE THE FLEXIBILITY AND FACILITY

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OF COMMUNICATION WHICH ARE PREREQUISITES FOR AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING BODY.

THESE ARE NOT MERELY OPINIONS; THEY ARE FACTS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND FACTS WHICH WE

BELIEVE THE CCD SHOULD BEAR IN MIND SO THAT IT CONTINUES
AS THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL FORUM FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIA-
TIONS.

THE STATEMENT OF THESE FACTS DOES NOT MEAN THERE SHOULD
BE NO CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATION OR FUNCTIONING OF THE
CCD. THERE ARE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORTANT STATES THAT ARE
NOT REPRESENTED AT THIS TABLE. FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED
STATES WOULD WELCOME PARTICIPATION BY SUCH STATES.
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ADDITIONALLY, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES. HOWEVER, BEFORE DISCARDING
PROVEN METHODS WE SHOULD ALL BE SATISFIED THAT ANY SUCH
CHANGES WOULD MAKE THE CCD A MORE EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING
BODY. WE SHOULD NOT ADOPT CHANGE MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF
CHANGE. OUR PRIMARY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE THE IMPORTANT
TASK WHICH LIES AHEAD -- THE TASK OF PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES WHICH REDUCE THE
COMPETITION IN ARMS AND STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF ALL
NATIONS. THIS IS A TASK AT WHICH WE MUST ALL CONTINUE TO
WORK IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A WORLD IN WHICH PEACE,
FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PREVAILS.
END TEXT. SORENSON

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Message Attributes

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Handling Restrictions: n/a
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ISecure: 1
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Litigation Codes:
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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SAS ID: 3445860
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Status: NATIVE
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